

Market-based Resource Control for Mobile Agents

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Abstract

Mobile agents are programs that can migrate from machine to machine in a heterogeneous, partially disconnected network. As mobile agents move across a network, they consume resources. We discuss a system for controlling the activities of mobile agents that uses electronic cash, a banking system, and a set of resource managers. We describe protocols for transactions between agents. We present fixed-pricing and dynamic-pricing policies for resources. We focus on and analyze the sealed-bid second-price auction as a mechanism for dynamic pricing.

1 Introduction

Mobile agents are programs that can migrate from machine to machine in a heterogeneous network. The program chooses when and where to migrate. It can suspend its execution at an arbitrary point, jump to another machine and resume execution on the new machine. Thus, mobile agents co-locate data and computation by bringing the computation to the data, rather than by bringing the data to the computation. Agents have the necessary autonomy to make decisions, and to interact with other agents and services to accomplish their goals. Our previous research [RGK97, KGN⁺97] shows that mobile agents have tremendous promise as a uniform paradigm for developing distributed applications, primarily because agents are easier to write than message- or RPC-based applications, their autonomy makes them well suited to poorly connected network environments, and they remove the need for distributed applications to have their own control language.

As mobile agents move across a network, they consume resources. How can we prevent agents from over-utilizing or wasting the resources on the computers they visit? This question becomes especially important in an environment that spans multiple administrative domains.

A realistic mobile-agent system must be able to work effectively in a heterogeneous, distributed environment. In the course of its lifetime, a single agent may visit many different

types of machines, which run different operating systems, and are administered by different organizations with different policies and goals. If a mobile-agent system is to work in such a situation, it is critical for the system architecture to include mechanisms for controlling resource usage, and include hooks to allow customization of the resource-control policies. Resources include everything from CPU time to screen space. The resource owners (i.e., the machines and their owners) need to control the quantity of resources used by each agent, particularly agents that are not owned by the same user or organization. It is not sufficient for each machine to control an agent's local resource usage, as might a traditional operating system; the agent's lifetime resource usage must also be controlled, to prevent agents from circulating forever. The agents themselves need to control their own resource usage, not only to optimize their own performance but also to respond effectively to limits imposed on them by the resource owners.

In this paper we present the market-based resource-control component of our mobile-agent system called D'Agents.¹ The D'Agents system supports inter-agent economic transactions with a system infrastructure consisting of a currency model, a banking system, and a set of currency-aware resource managers. This infrastructure allows (1) resource managers to set prices for resources and (2) agents to dynamically adapt to the resource-pricing environment to meet their goals within their resource constraints. We propose to use sealed-bid, second-price auctions to enable the resource managers to set prices dynamically in response to changing conditions, based on a set of abstract priorities set by their human owner. We present a lower bound for the the wait time in a sealed-bid second-price auction and discuss simulation experiments.

This paper is organized as follows. After a brief discussion of related work, Section 3 gives an overview of our mobile-agent system D'Agents. Section 4 describes the currency model, the distributed banking system, the resource managers, the protocols for transactions between agents, and an application that uses them to support a traveling salesperson. In Section 5 we discuss dynamic resource pricing with auctions, analyze auctions with respect to an agent's waiting time to receive a service, and present simulation results from running auctions among agents. We wrap up with a discussion in Section 6.

¹Previously known as Agent Tcl.

2 Related Work

Mobile agents permit the migration of an agent (a computation) to a data source. This co-location enhances programmers' flexibility in much the same manner as does multi-threaded programming, by allowing software authors another dimension to express solutions. D'Agents [Gra97, KGN⁺97] and Telescript [Whi94] are examples of systems supporting this form of migratory computation. Allowing processes to relocate, however, reinforces the importance of regulation. Social systems have evolved *markets* as simple distributed solutions to limiting consumption and facilitating trade.

Markets not only allow resource owners to rent out their capital for outside use, but place a limit on the lifetime of mobile processes by tying consumption to a limited currency supply. There have been several major approaches to setting prices in computational markets: sealed-bid auctions, reservation-style resource options, and priority pricing. Spawn [WHH⁺92] is an example of a system using second-price sealed-bid auctions to distribute resources. In Spawn, tasks compete for resources by submitting bids to the resource's owner. Bids can be expressed in a more complex manner than a simple price in systems like WALRAS [Wel96], where agents submit demand functions expressing the quantity desired at given prices. The market then computes a clearing price for goods. Waldspurger and Weihl [WW96] describe their allocation framework for selling shares that represent options for processor use. Holding a share ensures that an agent will receive a fraction of processor use proportional to the number of shares in circulation. Finally, it is possible to fix prices for multiple levels of service quality as described in [GSW97]. Prices can periodically be calibrated to match changing demand and encourage responsible consumption.

Markets require a mechanism to ensure reliable and legitimate transactions among agents. We propose using a trusted third party as an arbiter, though that is not the only solution. Sandholm [SL95] proposes game-theoretical situations where trade is likely to be safe given the maximum loss of a single transaction and the effect of defaulting on one's reputation. By adding a penalty for decommitting [SL96], agents can be persuaded to act in responsible fashion, while still having the flexibility to back out of a transaction in an emergency.

3 D'Agents: a Mobile Agent System

D'Agents [RGK97, Gra97, KGN⁺97] was developed to support mobile agents written in Agent Tcl, Agent Java, and Agent Scheme (extensions of Tcl, Java, and Scheme, respectively) over the past two years. The primary goal of the project has been to implement a computational paradigm that co-locates data and computation by bringing the computation to the data (rather than the data to the computation). D'Agents supports this paradigm with *mobile agents*, which are programs that can migrate under their own control from machine to machine in a heterogeneous network. In other words, the program can suspend its execution at an arbitrary point, migrate to another machine, and resume execution on the new machine. Mobile agents are especially suited for applications on disconnected computers such as laptops and palmtops that require filtering large amounts of data.

D'Agents reduces migration to a single instruction, provides simple communication among agents, and runs on generic Unix platforms. Our modified Tcl, Java, and (coming soon) Scheme interpreters can capture the internal state of an executing script (the stack, the contents of variables, etc.) at an arbitrary point. In addition, our modified interpreters provide a special set of commands that allow a program to migrate to other machines and to communicate with other migrating agents.

In our system, a mobile agent is simply a Tcl, Java, or Scheme program that runs in modified interpreters and uses the agent commands to roam through a network and interact with other agents. The program can decide to move to a new machine at any time. It issues the `agent_jump` command, which suspends script execution, captures and packages the internal state of the script, and sends this state image to an *agent server* on the destination machine (a special server runs on every machine to which mobile agents can be sent). The server restores the state image and the Tcl script continues execution on the new machine from the exact point at which it left off.

Our agents can communicate via message passing, stream connections, or remote procedure call [KGN⁺97]. An agent can use the Tk toolkit to present a graphical user interface on either its home machine or on a remote machine to which it has migrated.

D'Agents protects individual machines from malicious agents (as well as groups of machines that are under single administrative control) [Gra97, Gra96].

4 Resource Control

As mobile agents move across a network, they consume resources. How can we prevent agents from over-using or wasting the resources on the computers they visit? We developed a system for controlling the activities of mobile agents that uses electronic cash, a banking system, and a set of resource managers. In the following sections we describe the prototypes for each of these modules. These prototypes are modularized to enable easy experimentation with different resource managers, electronic cash models, and banking models.

4.1 Electronic Cash

Agents carry with them a finite amount of currency, which they pay to resource owners for the resources they use. As a result, agents have the freedom to choose how to spend their currency on resources. They can dynamically trade off space and time, for example, once they have seen the relative cost of the necessary resources, according to their own encoded priorities. In addition, resource owners have the freedom to choose how to price their resources. A workstation owner that does not wish to see its CPU bogged down by outside agents will set a high price on its CPU time.² Another workstation owner may find it has surplus CPU cycles, memory pages, disk blocks, and so forth, and may choose to price its resources more competitively. Alternatively, the resource prices can be set dynamically using the policies described in Section 5.

²Or, of course, it can use the security mechanisms to completely bar remote agents.

4.2 The Banking System

We developed a distributed system of banks to manage currency using on-line protocols that allow agents to talk to their banks while executing a transaction. Although we developed a simple protocol of our own, we plan to consider existing approaches used for Internet or smart-card commerce. We have also addressed off-line protocols in the case where the buyer and seller agent are willing to interact through the mediation of a trusted third party. The off-line protocols are especially important when mobile agents operate on disconnected devices such as laptops.

The banking system functions as follows. There are a small number of *bank agents*, which have the authority to issue currency. The banks trust each other. (In a real system, it is likely that the banks would be run by accredited organizations and carefully regulated, much as the banks in today's real world.) Each bank has a well-known public key, and a secret private key. (We use PGP for our public-key cryptosystem.)

Every machine and application agent that needs to handle currency contracts with the bank of their choice. They need only know and trust that one bank.

In our model, all agents, machines, and resources are ultimately owned by some person or organization. Thus, the currency collected through the sale of resources accumulates in the name of the resources' owners. Those entities may then allocate currency to agents that they wish to send out for their own business.

All currency is kept in *wallets*; a wallet is a set of *bills*; each bill is a unique, cryptographically signed document issued by one of the accredited banks. Each user and agent has its own wallet. Each bill is just a few bytes of information, indicating the name of the bank, the amount of the bill, the unique identifying number for that bill, and the bank's signature. The bank's signature is generated using its public key, and depends on all of the other bits in the bill. The authenticity of any bill can be quickly verified by checking the signature.

This agent-banking system can be extended to include human users who might interact with the agents. Each computer user would have their own wallet, as would each organizational entity. If the machines are owned by the organization, then they would accumulate currency through the sale of their resources, and distribute currency to their personnel to satisfy their needs.

When a user creates an agent, the user gives the agent a few bills for its wallet. As it travels the network, the agent must buy all of its resources, using this currency. This includes CPU time, disk space, queries, *etc.* If the agent runs out of currency, it can execute no longer. We expect host systems will have enough charity to send the agent back to its home machine, or at least to send a death notice to the home machine.

4.3 Transactions Using Electronic Cash

Suppose agent A wishes to pay agent B for a resource or service. In the simplest case, agent A has a bill in its wallet for exactly the correct amount. It gives that bill to agent B, that is, the bits are copied from some variable in agent A to some variable in agent B. (If necessary, this transmission can be encrypted with the public key of agent B to prevent other agents from intercepting the bill.) Agent B adds the bill to its wallet, and agent A removes the bill from its wallet.

To prevent the same bill from being used twice, agent B should validate the bill when it is received. The following protocol accomplishes this. Agent B sends the bill to its bank, bank B. Bank B sends the bill to the bank that issued the bill, Bank A. Bank A validates the authenticity of the bill and records the fact that it has been used, so that it cannot be used again. Bank B issues a new bill to agent B for the same amount. Agent B is now satisfied.

If agent A does not have a combination of bills that sum to the correct amount, it can break one of its larger bills into smaller bills by sending the bill to bank A.

Note that neither of the banks need know or validate the identity of the agents, only the currency.

4.4 Arbitrated Transactions

To prevent cheating, where agent B accepts the money without providing the service, or where agent A uses the service and then refuses to pay, we add a trusted third-party arbiter to the transaction (see Figure 1). This arbiter is especially useful when the two agents are exchanging large amounts of currency, or have reason to mistrust each other. When the arbiter is involved, both agents A and B are required to send some collateral currency to the arbiter. After it receives the collateral from both agents, the arbiter notifies both agents. The agents complete their transaction. If either agent complains within the pre-agreed time, the arbiter retains the other agent's collateral. At the end of the waiting period, the arbiter returns the collateral to each agent if the other agent had not complained. It is not in the best interest of an agent to cheat the other agent, because it loses its collateral. It is also not in the best interest of an agent to complain arbitrarily, since it will not gain anything, and the other party will simply retaliate and cause the first agent to lose its collateral also. An audit trail by the arbiter allows a final (human) source for reconciliation of disputes.




Figure 1: The arbiter protocol is used to prevent cheating. Agent A requests a service from Agent B. To start the transaction, Agent A gives the arbiter the cost of the service plus a given amount of e-cash collateral and Agent B gives the arbiter that same amount of e-cash collateral. Upon successful completion of the transaction, the Arbitrator Agent returns the collateral to Agent A and Agent B.

allow them to adapt to the supply and demand in the system. In this section we describe our work on dynamic pricing and illustrate it with simulation results.

Dynamic pricing is important for several reasons. First, we expect that it will be difficult to manually set prices that lead to a stable, healthy agent economy. Second, the system will change constantly, as resource supplies change (machines come and go) and resource demand changes (agents come and go). Indeed, there will clearly be daily and weekly cycles of activity: CPU time may be more expensive the middle of a workday than in the wee hours of Sunday morning. In addition, our experience with the World Wide Web shows that some resources are “hot” one day and not the next: e.g., a hurricane tends to make the weather-information servers busier.

5.1 Market Models for Resource Control

There are four primary approaches to dynamic pricing. Here, the seller is usually a resource manager, and the buyer is usually an agent.

1. Seller-adjusted pricing: in this approach, the seller monitors the demand for its services, adjusting the price as demand fluctuates.
2. Negotiation: the seller and the buyer haggle over each sale. This could be as simple as a double auction like in the stock exchange.
3. Seller-driven auctions: auctions are feasible when there are many buyers competing for the same item (resource), particularly when there are more buyers than there are items.
4. Buyer-driven auctions: here, sellers broadcast their prices, essentially bidding for buyers (for example, [CMM97]).

In the following section we discuss our work on seller-driven auctions.

5.2 Dynamic Pricing with Auctions

Auctions allow buyers to competitively set the price for goods being sold, although the seller may have a reservation price below which sale will not occur. By asking buyers for prices, the seller needs no information about current market demand and is able to capitalize on close to all of market demand.

In this section, we explore the use of auctions as a preliminary solution for resource control in a distributed agent environment. We examine various properties of sealed-bid second-price auction markets and their benefit to multi-agent systems.

Several types of auctions can be considered to drive dynamic pricing in a distributed agent system. In the standard English auction the seller openly announces a minimal price for the good to be sold. Buyers then take turns publicly submitting increasing bids or exiting the auction until only one potential buyer remains. Strategically, the optimal solution is for bidding to continue until the bidder willing to pay the most over-bids her competitors and pays the value of her closest competitor.

While English auctions are efficient in extracting buyer values, they often take many rounds to complete and thus

can be inefficient for agents. Instead, we investigate the *sealed-bid second-price auction* proposed by Vickery [Vic61]. The sealed-bid second-price auction is strategically identical to the English auction but it requires only a single round of bidding. Buyers privately submit their own valuations. The winner is the competitor submitting the highest bid, though the price of the good is the *highest losing bid*.

The best strategy for this type of auction is to submit a bid equal to the value of the good. There is no incentive to bid any lower; doing so only decreases the chance of victory without any effect on the quality of a successful auction, since the winner pays the loser’s bid. Bidding higher than one’s value is dangerous and risks over-payment (a fate worse than losing the auction.) Strategically, the English auction is equivalent to the sealed-bid second-price auction.

One beneficial side effect of sealed-bid second-price auctions is the near elimination of the revenue lost in some competitive markets. Even in a competitive market (where there are many sellers competing for buyers), a fixed price can cause revenue to be lost in two ways: consumer surplus and deadweight loss. *Consumer surplus* represents the loss of revenue from buyers who pay less than they are potentially willing to pay because the price is lower than their valuation.

When a higher price reduces the amount of product sold so much that the total utility (the sum of consumer surplus and revenue, the product of price and quantity) diminishes, the loss is called *deadweight loss*. This normally does not occur in competitive markets since equilibrium prices are equal to costs. However, the resources sold computational markets are, in the short term, produced regardless of demand or cost, so any unsold amount can be considered a loss to everyone, or deadweight loss. Auctions allow vendors to sell a portion of inventories below cost to maximize revenue intake.




Figure 3: Simple supply and demand curves showing the utility acquired by consumers and producers as well as the loss incurred by setting a single price. The area denoted as “Deadweight Loss” shows unsatisfied demand under the assumption that adequate production exists to fulfill demand. “Consumer Surplus” is the region showing how much more customers would have been willing to pay.

Using a second-price auction to sell items leads to sales at a variety of prices, since each auction sells to a different buyer at potentially a different price. The price is close to the actual value of the item, as determined by the buyer: since a second-price auction forces buyers to pay an amount close to their valuations, only the gap in bids between the highest and second highest buyers is lost. (Given enough competition, this gap is small.) This suggests that second-price auctions lead to highly efficient markets in scenarios where production quantities are an exogenous constant.

5.3 Modeling Auctions for Resource Allocation

To model and analyze the scope of sealed-bid second-price auctions for resource control we have developed a model and used simulation to evaluate it. In this model, many agents we will call *client agents* request service from resource managers we call *server agents*. All the servers sell a common resource called the *service*. Prices in this model are fixed with respect to quantity. Our model makes two assumptions. The first assumption is that the demand for the service is perfectly elastic with respect to quantity. That is, users are willing to pay the same price per unit regardless of quantity. This assumption makes sense if the system is to be used in an environment where all work presented to the system must be completed. The second assumption is that clients have enough electronic cash to complete their schedule of requests, but are stingy; they derive some amount of pleasure in conserving their currency pool.

Since prices are fixed with respect to quantity, the only way to affect the price is through varying the quality of the product. Goodness of service is measured by computing the price/performance ratio. Performance, in this model, is calculated as the time elapsed between the service request and service completion, normalized for the quantity requested. In this model, every client has an expectation of performance with respect to per unit prices based on previous experiences.

A measure that connects price and quality of service allows the clients to trade expenditure for performance, but further specification is necessary for users to be able to evaluate a good. In our model, clients have threshold for the level of service for which they are willing to pay. This threshold is described for every client as an isoquant curve in the price performance space — a curve upon which every point is equally desirable. Figure 4 shows an example of such a threshold. The threshold is used by clients to determine what is an acceptable price for a service request.




Figure 4: A sample curve describing a client's preference regarding price and performance.

5.4 Analyzing the Model

To understand the possible effect of sealed-bid second-price auctions on resource control in multi-agent systems, we compute buyers' mean waiting time to measure the distribution of wealth in the market. For simplicity, we assume that the request size is exponentially distributed and the request-arrival rates follow a Poisson distribution. Also, the request distributions are identical for all client agents; the distin-

guishing feature among agents is their priority of service (relative spending).

Consider for simplicity the case of one server (resource manager) and n clients (agents requesting the resource). Suppose the mean service-size request is μ and it occurs with mean frequency f . The expected wait time of the richest client is simply the server utilization times μ since the client willing to spend the most has only to wait for the user currently being serviced to complete.

The rest of the clients' expected waiting time is a bit more complex to calculate. The following results holds:

Theorem 5.1 (Lower Bounds) *In a sealed-bid second-price auction where clients have approximately the same request patterns, the lower bound for waiting time of the client that spends less than n other clients do is $1 - \rho' / (\ln \rho')^2$, where ρ' is the utilization by the n clients that spend more.*

Proof:

To simplify this exposition, suppose that clients spend unique amounts with respect to each other. The analysis can be extended for the general case as well.

The variables that affect a client's waiting time are the ordinality of the client's spending compared to the competition (in other words, how many clients are willing to spend more than the current client) and the expected time for the server to service all clients with higher bids. It is possible to derive the expected wait time for any particular client given the expected time to service all the clients with higher bids.

The utilization of a M/M/1 queued server is just the Poisson ratio function:

$$\rho = R(K, z) = 1 - \frac{\frac{z^K}{K!}}{\sum_{j=0}^K \frac{z^j}{j!}} \quad (1)$$

[Tan95, p. 244] where K is the number of clients in the system and z is the *service ratio* (the time taken between service requests, divided by time taken up by service). So z is:

$$z = \frac{1}{f\mu} \quad (2)$$

Since the arrival times are randomly independently distributed, the chance that a client requests service when the n clients with higher bids are idle is:

$$1 - R(n, \frac{1}{f\mu}) \quad (3)$$

An approximation for the expected wait time for the n^{th} richest client follows by noting that the system is memoryless and that the probability that the server will be able to serve a client is the utilization. Integrating over time we get the expected wait time:

$$\int_0^{\infty} (1 - \rho') \rho'^t t dt \quad (4)$$

Where $\rho' = R(n-1, z)$, is approximately the utilization of the queue by the $n-1$ clients with higher bids. This computation ignores the possibility that there could be a client with a lower bid being served at the time of arrival, but it serves as a lower bound on expected wait time and the approximation is more accurate for the poor and the rich clients.

Equation 4 integrates to:

$$\left[\frac{1 - \rho'}{\ln \rho'} e^{t \ln \rho'} (t - 1 / \ln \rho') \right]_0^\infty = \frac{1 - \rho'}{(\ln \rho')^2} \quad (5)$$

By substituting Equation 1 into Equation 5 for ρ' , we obtain the expected wait time as a function of expenditure rank, assuming that all clients have roughly the same request patterns.

The resulting function for wait time ensures that the wait times of poorer clients are severe in comparison to those of the wealthy because, in the estimation, the consumption of the poor have no effect on the rich. This suggests that better division of the resource pool is necessary for a scalable equitable market system. \square

5.5 Simulation Results

To verify the result in Theorem 5.1 we built a simulation of the sealed-bid second-price auction for one resource manager server and eight client agents. The client agents have unique preferences as assumed above. Given the spread in expected wait times, modeling preferences in this manner is somewhat tricky. In congested scenarios, the poorer clients are not able to obtain service that for which they are willing to pay.

Congestion is an important issue for mobile agents. Intuitively, it is easy to observe that all agents using a given service are affected by congestion at all levels of spending. Rich client agents have to wait at most the current service time of a poorer client plus the additional wait incurred by wealthier clients arriving in that time, so the estimation still serves as lower bound on expected wait time.

The simulation data illustrated in Figure 5 depict how spending rank determines average wait time. The plots are consistent with Theorem 5.1. We note that in this experiment, the eighth client in the scenario experienced long enough wait times that caused its evaluation of service to fall negative, so it left the market after only a few transactions.




Figure 5: Plot of spending rank versus average actual and estimated expected wait time with $z = 9$ and logarithmic scale.

6 Discussion

It is interesting to consider the implications of a system in which the agent currency is tied to legal currency (e.g., U.S.

Dollars). Indeed, it is almost inevitable. Consider an individual that buys an expensive and powerful workstation, and hooks it into the global agent system. The hardware resources of that workstation are assets that quickly earn the individual agent currency. Thus, the legal currency spent to purchase the workstation are translated into agent currency. The user may now spend the agent currency to send agents out into the system. Or, perhaps the user can sell the agent currency to another user, perhaps a user who has only a minimal workstation and thus little potential to gain currency, in exchange for legal currency. As a result, all of the world’s computational resources are sharable! Individuals can decide whether to own and maintain a workstation of their own, or to “rent” services from other machines.

The use of sealed-bid auctions is a simple first implementation of a market system. It is unclear whether auctions provide sufficient incentive to balance load and to smooth system-wide consumption; allowing users to set their own prices gives little motivation to move given any consumption.

This simple auction style overly favors the wealthy clients and myopically attempts to maximize sales. We are currently exploring another market scheme allowing the seller to rent out access rights to portions of a given resource to the highest bidders. In this revised system, buyers submit demand functions specifying the willingness to purchase the resource at any given price. A buyer effectively rents the right to access a share of the available resources until the price rises beyond the buyer’s budget. A single price is maximized under the constraint to completely sell all currently available resource shares.

We will implement these and perhaps other approaches to experiment with their feasibility in the systems and applications that we envision. It is likely that a hybrid approach will be necessary: for example, to use seller-adjusted pricing when the competition is fairly light, but to switch to an auction when the demand overwhelms the supply.

Needless to say, in a real system not all of the agents and resource managers will use the same algorithm for negotiation, bidding, or price setting. We are particularly interested in the effects on an economy when different algorithms clash with each other, or (in the worst case) when a malicious or buggy agent or service uses an irrational algorithm.

Clearly, there is a tremendous amount of work necessary to understand the policies and mechanisms necessary to manage all of the resources in a complex, distributed, agent system. We believe that the currency model has tremendous potential, and that our experimental study will lead to a deeper understanding of that potential as well as concrete suggestions for implementation in a real system.

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